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Introduction
A here-and-there (HT) model (H, T ) is a couple of sets of propositional variables, H ('here') and T ('there') such that H ⊆ T . We understand the inclusion informally as H being weaker than T . The logical language to talk about HT models has connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and →. The latter is interpreted in a non-classical way and is therefore different from material implication ⊃. Its truth condition is:
H, T |= ϕ → ψ iff H, T |= ϕ ⊃ ψ and T, T |= ϕ ⊃ ψ,
where ⊃ is interpreted just as in classical propositional logic.
2 HT models give semantics to an implication with strength between intuitionistic and material implication. They were investigated by Pearce, Valverde, Cabalar, Lifschitz, Ferraris, and others as the basis of equilibrium logic, the latter providing a semantical framework for answer-set programming [20, 19, 22, 5, 6, 14, 18] .
Equilibrium models of a formula, ϕ, are defined in an indirect way that is based on HT models: an equilibrium model of ϕ is a set of propositional variables T such that
T |= ϕ in propositional logic, and 2. there is no HT model (H, T ) such that H is strictly weaker than T and H, T |= ϕ.
Observe that the condition 'T |= ϕ in propositional logic' can be replaced by 'T, T |= ϕ in the logic of here-and-there'. To give an example, T = ∅ is an equilibrium model of p → ⊥ because (1) for the HT model (∅, ∅) we have ∅, ∅ |= p → ⊥, and (2) there is no set H that is strictly included in the empty set. Moreover, T = ∅ is the only equilibrium model of p → ⊥. To see this, suppose T is an equilibrium model for p → ⊥ for some T = ∅. Then T cannot contain p, otherwise condition (1) would be violated. Therefore T contains q for some q = p, but then condition (2) is violated since ∅, T |= p → ⊥.
In the present paper we give a direct semantics of equilibrium logic in terms of a modal language extending that of propositional logic by two unary modal operators, [T] and [S] . Roughly speaking, [T] allows to talk about valuations 3 that are at least as strong as the actual valuation; and [S] allows to talk about valuations that are weaker than the actual valuation. Our modal language can be interpreted on HT models. However, we also give a semantics in terms of Kripke models. We call our logic MEM: the Modal Logic of Equilibrium Models.
We relate the language of equilibrium logic to our bimodal language by means of the Gödel translation, tr, whose main clause is:
tr(ϕ → ψ) = [T] tr(ϕ) ⊃ tr(ψ) .
A first attempt to relate equilibrium logic to modal logic in the style of the present approach was presented in [12] . We here extend and improve that paper by simplifying the translation.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our modal logic of equilibrium models, MEM, 4 syntactically, semantically and also axiomatically. In Section 3 we recall both the logic of hereand-there and equilibrium logic. In Section 4 we define the Gödel translation, tr, from the language of the logic of here-and-there to the language of MEM and prove its correctness: for every formula ϕ, ϕ is HT valid if and only if tr(ϕ) is MEM valid. This theorem paves the way for the proof of the grand finale given in Section 5: ϕ is a logical consequence of χ in equilibrium logic if and only if the modal formula
is valid in MEM. It follows that ϕ has an equilibrium model if and only if tr(ϕ) ∧ [S]¬tr(ϕ) is satisfiable in the corresponding Kripke model. Section 6 makes a brief overview of our past, present and future interests. They all appear in a line of work that aims to reexamine the logical foundations of equilibrium logic and answer-set programming.
The modal logic of equilibrium models: MEM
We introduce the modal logic of equilibrium models, MEM, in the classical way: we start by defining its bimodal language and its semantics. Then we axiomatise its validities.
Language
Throughout the paper we suppose P is a countably infinite set of propositional variables. 
where p ranges over P. The formula [T]ϕ may be read "ϕ holds at every possible there-world at least as strong as the current world", and [S]ϕ may be read "ϕ holds at every possible weaker or equal here-world".
The set of propositional variables occurring in a formula ϕ is noted P ϕ . We use the following standard abbreviations:
Kripke frames
Consider the class of Kripke frames W, T , S such that
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; wmconv(T , S) for every w, u, if wT u then w = u or uSw; mconv(S, T ) for every w, u, if wSu then uT w.
We call a frame W, T , S satisfying the above-mentioned constraints a MEM frame. Let us explain these constraints informally.
To begin with, the first three constraints are about the relation T . The constraints refl(T ) and alt 2 (T ) say respectively that a world w is T -reflexive and has at most two T -successors. To sum it up, a world w is either a single T -loop or has an accompanying T -accessible world. Then the transitivity constraint, trans(T ), makes that the neighbouring T -accessible world is a single T -loop. Briefly, these constraints together imply the following constraint about the relation T : In words, every world can be reached in at most one T -step.
The next two constraints are about the relation S. Let S(u) = {v: uSv}. For any w, u, if wSu then the constraint refl 2 (S) gives us u ∈ S(u). The constraint wtriv 2 (S) tells us that when wSu then we must have S(u) = ∅ or S(u) = {u}. Together, they say that if wSu then S(u) = {u}: any world we access by the relation S can see itself through S, but none of the others. At this point, it is worth noting that S is trivially transitive due to wtriv 2 (S). It then also follows from this constraint that every world can be reached in at most one S-step. In other words, the relation S is of depth 1.
The next two constraints involve both T and S. We obtain from the weak mixed conversion constraint, wmconv(T , S), that T is contained in S −1 ∪ ∆ W , where ∆ W = {(w, w): w ∈ W } is the diagonal of W × W . Moreover, the mixed conversion constraint, mconv(S, T ), says that S is contained in T −1 . As a result, together with refl(T ) these two constraints give us T = S −1 ∪ ∆ W . Let us sum up the constraints that we have introduced so far: the T relation is a tree of height 0 or 1, and S is the converse of T , except for the root. In our frames, any root w is characterised by the fact that T (w) \ {w} is empty. MEM frames basically have the form of one of the diagrams depicted in Fig. 1 . The constraints wmconv(T , S), refl 2 (S), wtriv 2 (S), refl(T ) and alt 2 (T ) imply that for every w, T (w) ∩ S(w) is equal to either the empty-set or the singleton {w}.
The following properties hold for every MEM frame W, T , S . First, the relation T is serial, i.e., for all w there is a u such that wT u. Formally, this property is guaranteed by the constraint refl(T ). Moreover, T is directed, i.e., for every w, u, v, if wT u and wT v then there exists z such that uT z and vT z. This follows from the constraints refl(T ) and alt 2 (T ). Besides, T is also anti-symmetric, that is to say, for every w, u, if wT u and uT w then w = u. This follows from the constraints wmconv(T , S) and wtriv 2 (S). Together with mconv(S, T ), this implies that S is anti-symmetric, too. However, T is not euclidean: we may have wT u and wT w without uT w, and therefore the condition 'for every w, u, v, if wT u and wT v then uT v' does not hold in general. Finally, the relations T and S are trivially idempotent. 5 We obtain the idempotence property of T from depth 1 (T ), while we get that of S through wtriv 2 (S). As a last word, all of the properties above can be visualised from the diagram above; in addition, we can also see that the properties of seriality, euclideanity, and directedness don't hold for the relation S.
Kripke models
We interpret the formulas of our language L [T], [S] in a class of Kripke models that has to satisfy some particular constraints.
Consider the class of Kripke models M = W, T , S, V such that:
• W, T , S is an MEM frame;
• V is a valuation on W mapping all possible worlds w ∈ W to sets of propositional variables V w ⊆ P such that:
for every w, there exists u such that: wT u and if
A quadruple M = W, T , S, V satisfying all the conditions above is called an MEM model. Now let us comment a bit on the constraints heredity(S) and neg(S, T ). They involve not only the relations S and T , but also the valuation V . The constraint heredity(S) is just as the heredity constraint of intuitionistic logic, except that S is the inverse of the intuitionistic relation. The neg(S, T ) constraint basically says that if w is the root of a tree and has a non-empty valuation then the set of worlds that are 5 A relation r is idempotent if r • r = r, where • is the relation composition operation.
accessible from w via the relation S contains all those worlds u whose valuations V u are strictly included in V w . In every MEM model, if singleton points appear (such as in the leftmost two graphs in Fig. 1 ) then they should certainly have an empty valuation.
The following properties include the valuation as well.
The first property can be proved from wmconv(T , S) and heredity(S). The second property is due to heredity(S), neg(S, T ) and refl(T ). In words: for a root point w, 6 the set of valuations associated to the worlds that are accessible from w via S is either the set of subsets of V w , 2 V w , or the set of strict subsets of V w , 2 V w \ {V w }. This property will be used later in the paper in the proof of Theorem 12.
Truth conditions
The semantics of our bimodal logic is fairly standard, the relation T interpreting the modal operator [T] and the relation S interpreting the modal operator [S] . The truth conditions are:
iff M, u |= ϕ for every u such that wSu.
We say that ϕ has an MEM model when M, w |= ϕ for some model M and world w in M . We also say that ϕ is MEM satisfiable. Furthermore, ϕ is MEM valid if and only if M, w |= ϕ for every model M and possible world w in M .
The next proposition says that to check satisfiability it suffices to just consider models with finite valuations.
ϕ be defined as follows:
Proof. First, we prove that if ϕ is a subformula of χ then M, w |= ϕ if and only if M χ , w |= ϕ, by induction on the form of ϕ. The base case and the Boolean cases are routine. As for the modalities, we only give the proof for the case where ϕ is of the form [T]ψ, the case [S]ψ being similar. We have: Table 1 Axiomatisation of MEM.
K([T]) the axioms and the inference rules of modal logic K for [T] K([S])
the axioms and the inference rules of modal logic K for [S]
Let us show that M ϕ is also an MEM model. The frame constraints are only about the accessibility relations and are clearly preserved because we just modify the valuation. As for the constraints involving the valuation, the model M ϕ satisfies heredity(S) constraint: suppose wSu; as M satisfies heredity(S) we have 
Observe that Proposition 2 should not be confused with the finite model property (f.m.p.) of modal logics: the f.m.p. is about finiteness of the set of possible worlds, while Proposition 2 is about finiteness of valuations. We might call the latter finite valuation property (f.v.p.).
Axiomatics, provability, and completeness
The main purpose of this section is to give an axiomatisation of the MEM validities and to prove its completeness.
We start by defining the fragment of positive Boolean formulas of L [T], [S] by the following grammar:
We immediately observe that every positive Boolean formula is falsifiable. (Note that this holds because ⊤ is not a positive Boolean formula.) Now we are ready to give our axiomatisation of MEM. The axiom schemas and the inference rules are listed in Table 1 . As another example, we give the proof of the schema that corresponds to the heredity condition for Proof. Here is one more schema just concerning the T relation.
S ϕ
+ ⊃ ϕ + (Heredity([S])) 2. ϕ + ⊃ [T](ϕ + ∨ S ϕ + ) (WMConv([T], [S])) 3. ϕ + ⊃ [T]ϕ
Proposition 4. The schema, 2([T]), i.e., T [T]ϕ ⊃ [T] T ϕ is provable.
Proof.
T [T]¬ϕ ⊃ T ¬ϕ (from T([T]) by K([T])) 2. T [T]ϕ ⊃ T ([T]ϕ ∧ ϕ) (from T([T]) by K([T])) 3. [T]ϕ ∨ [T](ϕ ⊃ T ¬ϕ) ∨ [T]((ϕ ∧ T ¬ϕ) ⊃ ⊥) (Alt 2 ([T])) 4. ( T ¬ϕ ∧ T (ϕ ∧ [T]ϕ)) ⊃ [T](ϕ ⊃ [T]ϕ) (from 3 by K([T])) 5. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ [T](ϕ ⊃ [T]ϕ) (from 1, 2 and 4 by K([T])) 6. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ [T](¬ϕ ⊃ [T]¬ϕ) (from 5 by K([T])) 7. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ [T]([T]ϕ ∨ [T]¬ϕ) (from 5 and 6 by K([T])) 8. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ) (from 7 by T([T]) and 4([T])) 9. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ [T][T]ϕ) ⊃ T [T]⊥ (by K([T])) 10. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ [T][T]¬ϕ) ⊃ [T][T]¬ϕ (by K([T])) 1( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ)) ⊃ ( T [T]⊥ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ) (from 9 and 10) 12. ( T [T]ϕ ∧ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ)) ⊃ ( T [T]⊥ ∨ [T][T]ϕ) (from 11 by K([T])) 13. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ ∧ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ)) ⊃ ( T [T]⊥ ∨ ([T][T]ϕ ∧ [T][T]¬ϕ)) (from 11 and 12 by K([T])) 14. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ ( T [T]⊥ ∨ ([T][T]ϕ ∧ [T][T]¬ϕ))
(from 8 and 13)
( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ ( T [T]⊥ ∨ ⊥) (from 14 by K([T]) and T([T])) 16. ( T [T]¬ϕ ∧ T [T]ϕ) ⊃ T ⊥ (from 15 by T([T]) and K([T])) 17. ( T [T]ϕ ∧ T [T]¬ϕ) ⊃ ⊥ (from 16 by K([T])) 18. T [T]ϕ ⊃ [T] T ϕ (from 17 by K([T])).

✷
Let us turn to schemas about [S]. For example, 4([S]): [S]ϕ ⊃ [S][S]ϕ is a direct consequence of WTriv 2 ([S]). The proof is in one step by the K([S]) axiom and modus ponens (MP).
Finally, we state and prove a schema regarding both operators [T] and [S] that will be useful in the completeness proof.
Lemma 5. The following formula schema is provable:
for P, Q ⊆ P finite, P = ∅, and P ∩ Q = ∅.
Proof. Neg ′ ([S], [T]) can be proved using the axiom schema Neg([S], [T]) by standard modal logic principles, i.e., by K([T]).
Suppose P and Q are finite subsets of P such that P = ∅ and P ∩ Q = ∅. The implication
) follows through the argument below:
(from 2-3 by K[T]).
✷
Our axiomatisation is sound and complete.
Theorem 6. Let ϕ be an L [T],[S] -formula. Then ϕ is MEM valid if and only if ϕ is provable from the axioms and the inference rules of MEM.
Proof. Soundness is proved as usual. We just consider the proof of axiom schema Neg([S], [T]). Let ϕ + be a positive Boolean formula such that
Put ϕ + in conjunctive normal form (CNF), and let κ = ( P ) be a clause of this CNF, for some P ⊆ P ϕ + . Observe that P = ∅ by the definition of positive Boolean formulas and CNF. Now, we need to consider two cases (according to Remark 2 above). Case (1) . Let T (w) \ {w} = ∅. Hence T (w) = {w} by the reflexivity of T . Then from ( * ) we obtain that M, w |= ϕ + ∧ ψ ( * * ). Moreover, M, w |= ϕ + implies that V w = ∅. In addition, non-emptiness of V w yields that w is not a singleton point (because singleton points always have an empty valuation; otherwise that would contradict neg(S, T )). Now, take P w = P ∩ V w . We have P w = ∅ because M, w |= κ (since we have M, w |= ϕ + ). As M satisfies the constraint neg(S, T ), there exists u with wT u, but since T (w) = {w} we have u = w. Since V w = ∅, according to the negatable constraint, for non-empty P w ⊆ V w , there is v such that wSv and
In addition, M, v |= ψ because M, w |= ψ by ( * * ), P ϕ + ∩ P ψ = ∅, and V v = V w \ P w . Hence, we deduce that M, v |= ¬ϕ + ∧ ψ, but wSv, so we also have M, w |= S (¬ϕ + ∧ ψ). Finally, it is trivial to conclude that M, w |= T S (¬ϕ + ∧ ψ) since T (w) = {w}. Case (2). Let T (w) \ {w} = ∅. So there exists u with u = w and wT u. Moreover, u is uniquely determined (see Remark 2). Then we choose u, but not w, as a candidate to satisfy the formula ϕ + ∧ ψ (see ( * ) above). Hence, we obtain from ( * ) that M, u |= ϕ + ∧ ψ. The proof follows almost the same reasoning as in the previous case and we leave it to the reader. Following the same steps for u, we obtain M, u |= S (¬ϕ + ∧ ψ). Then M, w |= T S (¬ϕ + ∧ ψ) results automatically. To prove completeness w.r.t. MEM models we use canonical models [3, 7] . Let ϕ be a consistent L [T], [S] formula. We define the canonical model M ϕ = W, T , S, V as follows. W is the set of maximal consistent sets of MEM. The accessibility relations T and S are such that:
The valuation V is defined by V w = w ∩ P ϕ , for every w ∈ W . Let us prove that the canonical model
It is standard to prove that M ϕ satisfies the constraints associated to the axioms T([T]), Alt 2 ([T]), 4([T]), T 2 ([S]), and WTriv 2 ([S]).
• The weak mixed conversion axiom WMConv([T], [S]) implies that the constraint wmconv(T , S) is satisfied in the canonical model: suppose that wT u and w = u; we want to show uSw; assume for a contradiction that u isn't S-related to w ( * ); then there exists ϕ such that [S]ϕ ∈ u and ¬ϕ ∈ w; next, since w = u, there exists ψ with ψ ∈ w and ¬ψ ∈ u; as w is maximal consistent ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ w, but so is any instance of WMConv(
[T], [S]) as well; hence (¬ϕ
and then (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ S (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ u first through (MP) and then using our initial assumption wT u; ¬ψ ∈ u implies ¬ψ ∨ ϕ ∈ u, but then so must S (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ u; using maximal consistency of u we assert S (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊃ ( S ¬ϕ ∧ S ψ) ∈ u as well, but then so is S ¬ϕ ∧ S ψ ∈ u, which gives us the desired contradiction; eventually uSw.
• The mixed conversion axiom MConv([S], [T])
7 guarantees that the constraint mconv(S, T ) holds in the canonical model: let wSu and assume ϕ is such that [T]ϕ ∈ u; then by the definition of S, S [T]ϕ ∈ w; since w is maximal consistent, any instance of MConv([S], [T] ) is in w, so is S [T]ϕ ⊃ ϕ; therefore through (MP) we get ϕ ∈ w and this completes the proof.
• The axiom schema Heredity([S]) ensures that the canonical model satisfies the constraint heredity(S), viz. that for every w, u, wSu implies V u ⊆ V w : indeed, suppose wSu and p ∈ V u = u ∩ P ϕ ; as w is a maximal consistent set, it contains all instances of Heredity([S]), in particular, S p ⊃ p; since wSu we also obtain S p ∈ w from p ∈ u. (Otherwise, w being maximal consistent, it includes ¬ S p = [S]¬p; since wSu by assumption, we get ¬p ∈ u, contradicting the fact that u is consistent since p ∈ u as well.) Hence, p ∈ w, and so p ∈ w ∩ P ϕ = V w .
• The negatable axiom Neg([S], [T]) guarantees that neg(S, T ) holds in the canonical model: to see this take an arbitrary w ∈ W ; since the canonical model satisfies the constraints refl(T ) and alt 2 (T ) (as the reader can easily check), we go through the following two cases:
Case (i). Let T (w) \ {w} = ∅. Hence T (w) = {w} by the reflexivity of T . (Then it is trivial to conclude that there exists u such that wT u, and moreover u = w.) If V w = w ∩ P ϕ = ∅ (i.e., if w contains the negations of the propositional variables of ϕ) then the constraint trivially holds. Let V w = ∅. Suppose P ⊆ V w = w ∩ P ϕ is such that P = ∅. Then we choose Q = V w \ P . Since P, Q ⊆ P are finite with P = ∅ and P ∩ Q = ∅, now we can use Lemma 5. As w is a maximal consistent set it includes ( p∈P p) ∧ ( q∈Q q), but then also T (( p∈P p) ∧ ( q∈Q q)) since T (w) = {w}. Next, again since w is maximal consistent, by Lemma 5 it also has every instance of Neg
, so it must contain T S (( p∈P ¬p) ∧ ( q∈Q q)) as well. By our initial assumption, S (( p∈P ¬p) ∧ ( q∈Q q)) ∈ w. Thus we can conclude that there is v ∈ W such that wSv. Furthermore v contains ( p∈P ¬p) ∧ ( q∈Q q). Therefore, P ∩v = ∅ and Q ⊆ v, but the canonical model satisfies the heredity(S) constraint (see above), so V v ⊆ V w . We know that P, Q ⊆ P ϕ are mutually exclusive and cover V w . Also, Q ⊆ v and
It is obvious from our assumption that there exists u such that u = w and wT u. Moreover, since the canonical model satisfies the constraints refl(T ) and alt 2 (T ) (which is easy to prove), we claim that T (w) = {w, u}. Additionally, trans(T ) also holds in the canonical model (again easily verified), so we further have T (u) = {u}. Therefore the rest of the proof can basically be done in the same way as before.
To sum it up, the canonical model M ϕ satisfies all constraints, and is therefore a legal MEM model. Moreover, as ϕ is a consistent MEM formula, there must exist a maximal MEM consistent set w ⊆ W containing ϕ. It can then be proved in the standard way that M ϕ , w |= ϕ. ✷
HT logic and equilibrium logic
In this section we recall HT logic and equilibrium logic.
The language L →
The language L → is common to HT logic and equilibrium logic. It is defined by the following grammar:
where p ranges over P. The other Boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations in the same way as in our bimodal language: negation ¬ϕ is defined as ϕ → ⊥, and ⊤ is defined as ⊥ → ⊥.
Here-and-there logic
A HT model is a couple (H, T ) such that H ⊆ T ⊆ P. The sets H and T are respectively called 'here' and 'there'.
Let (H, T ) be an HT model. The truth conditions are as follows:
T |= ψ) and (T, T |= ϕ or T, T |= ψ).
When H, T |= ϕ we say that (H, T ) is an HT model of ϕ. A formula ϕ is HT valid if and only if every HT model is also an HT model of ϕ.
We can claim as a consequence of the following lemma that the finite model property (perhaps better called a finite valuation property) holds for HT logic: if an L → -formula ϕ has an HT model then there also exists a pair of finite here and there sets (H, T ) such that H, T |= ϕ. This is the counterpart of Proposition 2.
Lemma 7. Let ϕ be an L → -formula and let q be a propositional variable such that q / ∈ P ϕ . Then H, T |= ϕ iff H, T ∪ {q} |= ϕ iff H ∪ {q}, T ∪ {q} |= ϕ.
Equilibrium logic
An equilibrium model of an L → -formula ϕ is a set of propositional variables T ⊆ P such that:
(T, T ) is an HT model of ϕ; 2. no (H, T ) with H ⊂ T is an HT model of ϕ.
Here are three examples. First, the empty set is the only equilibrium model of both ⊤ and ¬p: for any q ∈ P, {q} is neither an equilibrium model of ⊤ nor of ¬p. Second, as ∅, {p} |= ¬p → q, the set {p} is not an equilibrium model of ¬p → q. Third, {q} is an equilibrium model of ¬p → q because {q}, {q} |= ¬p → q and ∅, {q} |= ¬p → q.
For two L → -formulas ϕ and χ, we say that ϕ is a consequence of χ in equilibrium models, written χ | ≈ ϕ, if and only if for every equilibrium model T of χ, (T, T ) is an HT model of ϕ. For example, ⊤ |≈ ¬p and ¬p | ≈ ⊤. We also have q | ≈ ¬p → q and ¬p → q | ≈ q.
From HT logic and equilibrium logic to the modal logic, MEM
In this section we are going to translate HT logic and equilibrium logic into our logic MEM.
Translating
To warm up, let us translate the language L → of both HT logic and equilibrium logic into the sub-language L [T] of MEM. We recursively define the mapping tr as follows:
This translation is similar to the Gödel translation from intuitionistic logic to modal logic S4 whose main clause is tr(ϕ → ψ) = ✷(tr(ϕ) ⊃ tr(ψ)), where ✷ is an S4 operator (just as the [T] operator of our bimodal logic).
Here are some examples.
This is equivalent to ⊤ in any normal modal logic.
This is equivalent to [T]¬p in any normal modal logic.
This is equivalent to p ∨ [T]¬p in any normal modal logic.
From HT logic to MEM
On HT models, the fragment L 
Then M T is an MEM model, and H, T |= ϕ if and only if M T , H |= tr(ϕ), for every H ⊆ T and
In the last line, S is defined as the (relative) difference between the inverse of T and {(T, T )}. For example, for T = ∅ we obtain M ∅ = (W, T , S, V ) with W = {∅}, T = {(∅, ∅)}, and S = ∅; and for T = {p} we obtain M {p} = W, T , S, V with W = {∅, {p}}, T = {(∅, ∅), (∅, {p}), ({p}, {p})}, and S = {(∅, ∅), ({p}, ∅)}.
Proof. First, M T is a legal MEM model: M T satisfies all constraints by construction, i.e., refl(T ), alt 2 (T ), trans(T ), refl 2 (S), wtriv 2 (S), wmconv(T , S), mconv(S, T ), heredity(S), and neg(S, T ). Second, one can prove by a straightforward induction on the form of ϕ that H, T |= ϕ iff M T , H |= tr(ϕ), for every H ⊆ T . ✷ Proposition 9. Let M = W, T , S, V be an MEM model. Then for every w ∈ W and every L → -formula ϕ we have:
Proof. As expected we go through induction on the form of ϕ in both cases. For the first case T (w)\{w} = ∅, the base, the Boolean and even the intuitionistic implication steps are straightforward. For the second case, suppose T (w) \ {w} = ∅. Then T (w) \ {w} contains exactly one element, say u (see Remark 2) . The base and the Boolean cases are still easy, and only the case of intuitionistic implication is worth analysing. We sketch of the argument and leave the gaps to the reader. We have: (=⇒): Let M = W, T , S, V be an MEM model and let w ∈ W . We have to go through two cases. Case 1. Assume that T (w) \ {w} = ∅. By assumption, we know that (V w , V w ) is an HT model of ϕ. Therefore, by Proposition 9 we have M, w |= tr(ϕ).
Case 2. Suppose that T (w) \ {w} = ∅. Then there exists a unique u such that T (w) = {w, u} is of cardinality 2 (see Remark 2). Hence, Proposition 1.1 gives us V w ⊆ V u . Next, by hypothesis (V w , V u ) is an HT model of ϕ. Therefore, by Proposition 9, M, w |= tr(ϕ). ✷
From equilibrium logic to MEM
The same construction as for HT logic allows us to turn equilibrium models into MEM models.
Proposition 11. Let T ⊆ P, and let M T = W, T , S, V be a quadruple such that:
T ;
V h = h, for every h ∈ W ;
Then M T is an MEM model, and T is an equilibrium model of ϕ if and only if M T , T |= tr(ϕ) ∧ [S]¬tr(ϕ),
for every L → -formula ϕ. We are now ready for the grand finale where we capture equilibrium logic in our bimodal logic, MEM. is MEM valid.
